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Abstract
This paper proposes a new method for welfare analysis of unfunded social security
systems. Based on an overlapping generations model with endogenous labor supply, we
derive a formula for the evaluation of existing pay-as-you-go social security systems that
depends on impulse response functions and projected growth rates only. We propose
an implementation strategy based on reduced form estimates of a VAR model that is
valid under weak assumptions about the deep structure of the model. Our method is
related to the sufficient statistic approach (Chetty, 2009). For the current system in the
United States, we find that a transitory increase in the payroll tax rate along with higher
pension benefits leads to a welfare increase mainly due to welfare gains of today’s retirees.
A scenario analysis demonstrates the robustness of this result.
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1 Introduction
Unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security systems play an important role in many
developed countries’ social insurance programs. Since demographic changes and the associ-
ated growing fraction of retirees in the population cause increasing financial stress for these
systems, the question of how to design social security systems optimally becomes more and
more relevant.
Social security systems are typically studied in the context of structural overlapping gen-
erations (OLG) models (examples include: Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987; Imrohoroglu et al.,
1995; Kotlikoff et al., 1999, 2007; Nickel et al., 2008; Fehr et al., 2012; McGrattan and Prescott,
2013, among many others).1 Welfare analysis in these models proceeds in two steps: first, the
deep structure of the model (preferences and production function) is parameterized and esti-
mated. Second, the effect of different policies and alternative social security systems on social
welfare is computed using simulation methods. This approach features two main drawbacks:
first, even flexible functional form assumptions might be arbitrary and hard to justify and
second, it is typically difficult to estimate and identify all deep parameters in an empirically
compelling manner.
This paper contributes to the literature by proposing a new method for welfare analysis
of social security systems. Based on a Ramsey problem in a standard OLG model (cf. Dia-
mond, 1965) augmented with endogenous labor supply, we derive a formula for the welfare
consequences of changes in payroll taxes used to finance transfers in PAYGO systems. This
formula does not depend on the deep structure of the model but rather on few high level
quantities, which allows us to identify and estimate marginal welfare changes avoiding impor-
tant parametric assumptions. In particular, we do not require specifying the functional form
of the aggregate production function nor a full parameterization of household preferences.
Because our formula is a function of high level quantities rather than the deep structure
of the model, it can be interpreted as a sufficient statistic (in the sense of Chetty, 2009). The
sufficient statistic approach to welfare analysis has recently become important in the public
economics literature (see e.g. Chetty, 2009, for a review). It provides a middle course between
structural models and reduced-form methods. From the structural approach, it borrows the
ability to make predictions about welfare, but avoids the problem of having to estimate or
1An important focus of these studies has been on shifts from a primarily unfunded system towards mixed
systems that combine PAYGO with investment based personal retirement accounts.
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calibrate the deep parameters of the model. From the reduced-form approach, it borrows
the advantage of transparent and credible identification. To the best of our knowledge, the
sufficient statistic approach has not yet been used to analyze social security systems in the
context of macroeconomic dynamic general equilibrium models.
The central insight of our theoretical analysis is that a change in the tax rate affects
welfare through three distinct channels: first, the direct effect of getting more transfers and
paying more taxes, second, the effect through changes in factor prices, and third, the change
in transfers due to the labor adjustment of the subsequent generations.
To implement the sufficient statistic formula empirically, we propose two different ap-
proaches. First, we consider approximate consumption equivalent impacts on each generation.
The advantage of this approach is that we do not require any assumptions on preferences.
Second, to be able to evaluate the total impact of a change in the payroll tax, we obtain
a money metric of the welfare effect of a marginal change in the tax rate by an appropri-
ate standardization. Because the overall effect inherently requires a comparison of weighted
marginal utilities of different generations, we need to impose arguably weak assumptions on
preferences and welfare weights. We show that for both approaches, welfare changes can be
stated as functions of impulse response functions and predictions of future growth rates only.
This allows for an empirical implementation based on the reduced form estimates of a vec-
tor autoregressive (VAR) model. Our empirical strategy therefore differs from the sufficient
statistic literature (Card et al., 2007; Chetty, 2008, 2009) that merely relies on cross sectional
estimates which is not possible in this paper given the dynamic general equilibrium nature
of the theoretical model.
We illustrate our approach by assessing the PAYGO system of the United States. We find
that in terms of approximate consumption equivalents, a marginal increase in the payroll tax
raises welfare of today’s retirees substantially and of today’s workers slightly, while it reduces
the welfare for future generations. A decomposition by theoretical channels reveals that
factor price effects (i.e. induced changes in wage and interest rates) are the most important
determinants of welfare changes. In terms of the overall effect, our findings indicate that
for a broad range of values for the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the individual
discount factor a marginal increase in the payroll tax is welfare increasing. Consistent with
the approximate findings for the generationwise welfare changes, we find that the overall
effect is mainly driven by the factor price effect. A scenario analysis confirms the robustness
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of our empirical findings.
Our paper differs from the aforementioned literature on structural OLG models in two
main respects. First, it provides a new and complementary method for evaluating PAYGO
systems. Under weak assumptions, we derive a sufficient statistic formula for welfare evalu-
ation that can be implemented empirically. Second, our paper has a different focus. While a
large strand of the literature analyzes the welfare consequences of shifts in the structure of
the pension system, we focus on the evaluation of existing PAYGO systems.
The analysis in this paper is also related to studies focusing on globally optimal PAYGO
system (e.g. Feldstein, 1985; Imrohoroglu et al., 1995). However, the analysis in this paper
has a somewhat different focus on local welfare improvements due to small changes in the
payroll tax.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
derives a formula for the welfare analysis of a change in the payroll tax. In section 3, we use
this formula to assess the welfare consequences of a change in the payroll tax for the United
States. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
We consider a deterministic OLG model with endogenous labor supply. The framework is
closely related to the setups considered by Breyer and Straub (1993), Nourry (2001), Fanti
and Spataro (2006), Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) and Lopez-Garcia (2008). First, we
discuss the problems of the household and the representative firm. Second, we character-
ize the competitive equilibrium. Third, we analyze the Ramsey problem of the benevolent
government assuming fixed labor supply for the purpose of illustrating our procedure and
comparing it to the literature. Then, we extend the Ramsey problem to the more relevant
case of elastic labor supply and derive a formula for the welfare consequences of a change in
the payroll tax. Finally, we propose two approaches to empirically implement this formula.
2.1 Demographics, preferences and technology
We consider a deterministic, perfectly competitive economy inhabited by an infinite sequence
of overlapping generations.2 Each generation lives for two periods. In the first period,
2There is an initial old generation at the beginning.
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households supply labor elastically, 0 ≤ nt ≤ n̄.3 In the second period, they retire. Population
grows at an exogenously given rate. Let Lt denote the size of the labor force (i.e. the size
of the young generation) in period t and define χt,z ≡ LzLt − 1 as the working age population
growth rate between two periods t and z.
Households have preferences over consumption in both periods and leisure lt = n̄ − nt.
Consumption in the first period, cyt , equals post tax labor income, ntwt(1 − τt) where τt
denotes the payroll tax, minus savings st+1. In the second period, households consume
cot+1, which is equal to the gross returns on savings, Rt+1st+1, plus lump sum social security
benefits, Tt+1, and profits of the firm,
Πt+1
Lt
, where Πt+1 is the overall profit of firms which
is distributed across the capital owners. Preferences are summarized by the utility function
u(cyt , n̄ − nt, cot+1) with ucy(·) > 0, ul(·) > 0, uco(·) > 0, ucycy(·) < 0 and ucoco(·) < 0. The
intertemporal decision of the household solves
max
nt,c
y
t ,c
o
t+1,st+1
u(cyt , n̄− nt, cot+1)
s.t. cyt + st+1 = ntwt(1− τt)
cot+1 = Rt+1st+1 + Tt+1 +
Πt+1
Lt
For later reference, define λyt and λ
o
t+1 to be the Lagrange multipliers associated with the bud-
get constraint of the household when young and old, respectively. The first order conditions
of the household maximization problem read:
λyt = ucy(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1) (1)
λytwt(1− τt) = ul(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1) (2)
λot+1 = uco(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1) (3)
λyt = Rt+1λ
o
t+1 (4)
The saving’s decision of a household in cohort t is given by the usual consumption Euler
equation:
ucy(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1) = Rt+1uco(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1). (5)
3n̄ denotes the number of available hours in a time period that can be split between leisure and work.
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The labor supply is described by:
ucy(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1)wt(1− τt) = ul(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1). (6)
(5) and (6) combined with the household’s budget constraints map factor prices wt and Rt+1,
policy variables τt and Tt+1, and profits
Πt+1
Lt
into savings and labor:
st+1 = S(wt, τt, Tt+1, Rt+1, nt,
Πt+1
Lt
) (7)
nt = N(wt, τt, Tt+1, Rt+1, st+1,
Πt+1
Lt
) (8)
The firm sector is characterized by a set of competitive firms that can be represented by
an aggregate production function, F (Kt, HtEt), that maps inputs of capital Kt and hours
worked Ht = Ltnt into output. Et denotes exogenous labor efficiency. The problem of the
firm is static. In each period, the representative firm solves
max
Kt,Ht
F (Kt, HtEt)− wtHt − rtKt.
The first order conditions of the firm problem imply:
wt = FHE(Kt, HtEt)Et (9)
rt = FK(Kt, HtEt) (10)
We impose the following standard assumption on the aggregate production function.
Assumption 1. F (Kt, HtEt) exhibits constant returns to scale.
Assumption 1 and the Euler theorem imply zero profits (Πt = 0) in equilibrium.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium without pension system
Before turning to the planner’s problem, we characterize a competitive equilibrium in this
economy absent a PAYGO system, i.e. τt = 0 and Tt = 0 for all t = 0, ..,∞. A competi-
tive equilibrium in this OLG economy is a sequence of aggregate capital stocks, household
consumption, labor supply, and factor prices {Kt, cyt , cot , nt, Rt, wt}∞t=0 such that firms’ input
and output choices are profit maximizing given factor prices, households’ consumption and
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labor supply decisions are utility maximizing given factor prices and firms’ profits, and the
allocation is feasible. Factor market clearing implies:
Kt = stLt−1 (11)
Ht = ntLt (12)
Since capital is the only asset that households may save in, the gross return on savings
corresponds to
Rt = 1− δt + rt, (13)
where δt denotes the depreciation rate of the capital stock. Combining the households’ budget
constraints with (9), (10) and (13) implies the goods market equilibrium:
F (Kt, HtEt) = Ltc
y
t + Lt−1c
o
t +Kt+1 − (1− δt)Kt. (14)
2.3 A Ramsey problem with inelastic labor supply
We consider a benevolent government that seeks to maximize social welfare, W , subject to
technological and competitive equilibrium constraints. Based on the problem of a Ramsey
planner, our approach is to analyze the welfare change induced by a change of the payroll
tax, dW/dτ . In contrast to the standard procedure, we do not solve for the optimal sequence
of payroll taxes. Instead, we are interested in the welfare effect of a one-time change in the
current tax rate. This focus is motivated by the two period nature of our model where a
sensible choice of the period length is multiple decades.4 A straightforward alternative would
be to consider a permanent change in the payroll tax. Our goal is to derive an empirically
implementable expression for dW/dτ that is a function of empirically estimable high level
elasticities.
To illustrate our procedure and to compare it to the literature, we first consider an
economy with fixed labor supply.
Assumption 2. Individual labor supply nt is inelastic and normalized to 1.
For the ease of notation, we define u(cyt , 1, c
o
t+1) ≡ u(c
y
t , c
o
t+1). Notice that Assumption 2
4Following the literature, we will choose a period length of 30 years for the empirical implementation.
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implies that Lt = Ht. We extend our analysis to the empirically more relevant case of elastic
labor supply in the next section.
Under Assumption 2, following Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt (2007, 2008), the program of
the government with commitment – the Ramsey program – for a given sequence of welfare
weights {ξt} at t = 0 is given by
max
0≤{τt}∞t=0≤1
W =
∞∑
t=0
ξtu(c
y
t , c
o
t+1) + ξ−1u
(
cy−1, c
o
0
)
subject to

s0, c
y
−1 given
st+1 = S(wt, τt, Tt+1, Rt+1, 1, 0) t ≥ 0
household budget constraints
(15)
We assume throughout that the sequence of welfare weights {ξt} is declining sufficiently fast
for the problem to be well defined. The pay-as-you-go character of the social security system
implies that retiree pensions paid are equal to the taxes collected:
Lt−1Tt = wtτtLt
Using the envelope conditions of the household maximization problem, the effect of a
marginal increase in the current payroll tax rate τ0 on the Ramsey planner’s objective function
is given by
dW
dτ0
= −w0ucy(cy0, c
o
1)ξ0 + w0(1 + χ−1,0)uco(c
y
−1, c
o
0)ξ−1 + Ψ0 (16)
where Ψ0 summarizes the general equilibrium effects of a change in τ0. The total effect can
be decomposed into three components. The first term in (16) measures the direct welfare loss
of the young generation caused by an increase in tax payments. The second term reflects the
direct welfare gain of the old generation in period t = 0 due to an increase in social security
transfers. Using the FOC of the household optimization problem, the net social benefit of
transferring one unit of resources in period t = 0 from young to old can be expressed as
w0(1 + χ−1,0)uco(c
y
−1, c
o
0)ξ−1 − w0ucy(c
y
0, c
o
1)ξ0 (17)
Besides the direct redistribution effects, a change in τ0 has general equilibrium effects that
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are captured in Ψ0. The policy change in period t = 0 causes a change in savings and, thus,
in the capital stock, which in turn affects future wages and interest rates and, consequently,
social welfare (for the ease of notation, we replace the marginal utilities of the households by
the respective multipliers):
Ψ0 =
∞∑
t=1
dwt
dτ0
(1− τt)λyt ξt +
∞∑
t=0
(
dRt+1
dτ0
st+1 +
dTt+1
dτ0
)
λot+1ξt
=
∞∑
t=1
dwt
dτ0
(1− τt)λyt ξt +
∞∑
t=0
(
dRt+1
dτ0
st+1 + (1 + χt,t+1)τt+1
dwt+1
dτ0
)
λot+1ξt
Due to constant returns to scale, there is a direct relation between dRtdτ0 and
dwt
dτ0
. Totally
differentiating F (Kt, HtEt) = wtHt + rtKt with respect to τ0 implies
5
FK(Kt, HtEt)
dKt
dτ0
+ FHE(Kt, HtEt)Et
dHt
dτ0
=
dwt
dτ0
Ht + wt
dHt
dτ0
+
drt
dτ0
Kt + rt
dKt
dτ0
Using (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13), this simplifies to
dRt
dτ0
=
drt
dτ0
= −dwt
dτ0
Ht
Kt
= −dwt
dτ0
nt(1 + χt)
st
(18)
Using the optimality condition (4) of the household problem, we can replace λyt by λ
o
t+1Rt+1.
The overall welfare change given a change in τ0 can therefore be expressed as follows:
dW
dτ0
=− w0λo1R1ξ0 + w0(1 + χ−1,0)λo0ξ−1
+
∞∑
t=0
dwt+1
dτ0
(1− τt+1)
(
λot+2Rt+2ξt+1 − (1 + χt,t+1)λot+1ξt
)
(19)
2.4 Elastic labor supply
The results in the previous section were derived assuming inelastic labor supply. Clearly, this
assumption is not satisfactorily because labor supply is likely to respond directly or indirectly
to demographic developments (Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008). Moreover, distortions
induced by the payroll tax can have important welfare consequences that must be considered
in the evaluation of changes in tax rates.
With elastic labor supply, the program of the Ramsey planner at t = 0 for a given sequence
5Labor efficiency Et is exogenous and therefore
dEt
dτ0
= 0.
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of welfare weights {ξt} reads
max
0≤{τt}∞t=0≤1
W =
∞∑
t=0
ξtu(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1) + ξ−1u
(
cy−1, n̄− n−1, c
o
0
)
subject to

s0, c
y
−1, n−1 given
st+1 = S(wt, τt, Tt+1, Rt+1, nt, 0) t ≥ 0
nt = N(wt, τt, Tt+1, Rt+1, st+1, 0) t ≥ 0
household budget constraints
(20)
where transfers are given by Tt = ntwtτt(1 + χt−1,t). The effect of a marginal increase in the
current payroll tax rate τ0 on welfare is given by
dW
dτ0
= w0n0((1 + χ−1,0)λ
o
0ξ−1 − λ
y
0ξ0) + Ψ0, (21)
where Ψ0 summarizes the effects of adjustments in nt, wt and Rt due to the change in τ0.
In contrast to the case of inelastic labor supply, w0 is not predetermined by K0 any more.
Instead, it also depends on H0, which may be affected by a change in τ0. Ψ0 is given by:
Ψ0 =
∞∑
t=0
ξt
(
λyt
dwt
dτ0
nt(1− τt) + λot+1
(
dRt+1
dτ0
st+1 +
dTt+1
dτ0
))
+ ξ−1λ
o
0
(
dR0
dτ0
s0 + τ0(1 + χ0)
(
n0
dw0
dτ0
+ w0
dn0
dτ0
))
Using
dTt+1
dτ0
=
dnt+1
dτ0
wt+1τt+1(1 + χt,t+1) +
dwt+1
dτ0
nt+1τt+1(1 + χt,t+1),
dRt+1
dτ0
= −dwt+1
dτ0
nt+1(1 + χt,t+1)
st+1
,
λyt = Rt+1λ
o
t+1,
we get the following overall welfare effect:
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dW
dτ0
=w0n0(−λo1R1ξ0 + (1 + χ−1,0)λo0ξ−1)
+
∞∑
t=0
dwt
dτ0
nt(1− τt)(λot+1Rt+1ξt − (1 + χt−1,t)λot ξt−1) (22)
+
∞∑
t=0
dnt
dτ0
wtτt(1 + χt−1,t)λ
o
t ξt−1
At this point, it is worthwhile discussing the different channels of the overall welfare effect
in more detail. There are three basic components, each of which corresponds to a line in
equation (22). First, there is the direct effect of getting more transfers and paying higher
taxes. The initial old generation benefits while the initial young households are worse off.
Second, there are indirect welfare effects owing to the impact of the policy change on factor
prices. The effect of factor prices consists of three components: changes in the wage for the
young household, changes in the interest rate and changes in the wage that affect the old
households through transfers. Third, for each generation there is an indirect welfare effect due
to the labor adjustment of the subsequent generation. Grouping the overall welfare change
by generations, equation (22) can be rewritten as follows:
dW
dτ0
=ξ−1λ
o
0
(
w0n0(1 + χ−1,0)−
dw0
dτ0
n0(1− τ0)(1 + χ0) +
dn0
dτ0
w0τ0(1 + χ−1,0)
)
+ ξ0λ
o
1
(
−R1w0n0 +R1
dw0
dτ0
n0(1− τ0)−
dw1
dτ0
n1(1− τ1)(1 + χ0,1)
+
dn1
dτ0
w1τ1(1 + χ0,1)
)
(23)
+
∞∑
t=1
ξtλ
o
t+1
(
Rt+1
dwt
dτ0
nt(1− τt)−
dwt+1
dτ0
nt+1(1− τt+1)(1 + χt,t+1)
+
dnt+1
dτ0
wt+1τt+1(1 + χt,t+1)
)
Clearly, only the initial old and young generation are directly affected by higher transfers and
higher tax rates, respectively, while factor price and labor supply changes have an indirect
impact on all generations.
At this point, the standard approach to proceed in the literature is to parameterize the
deep structure of the model, i.e. impose functional form assumptions on preferences and
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the aggregate production function and express dW/dτ0 as a function of a set of primitives
that need to be estimated from the data. In this paper, we follow an alternative strategy.
We make use of the fact that equation (23) is a function of (i) dwt/dτ0, t = 0, ...,∞, (ii)
marginal utilities and (iii) predicted economic quantities such as labor supply and wages. Put
it differently, in order to identify and estimate dW/dτ0 it is sufficient know quantities (i) to
(iii). The key point is that knowledge of the deep parameters that generate this quantities is
not required and, thus, a full specification of the deep structure of the model can be avoided.
We argue in section 3 that (i) can be identified and estimated using a reduced form VAR
and that empirical predictions can be used to compute (iii). The remaining challenge is to
identify the marginal utilities empirically. We propose two alternative approaches. In section
2.5, we show that it is possible to compute first order approximations for the consumption
equivalent impact of a marginal change in the payroll tax for each generation without further
assumptions on preferences. Identification and estimation of the overall effect dW/dτ0 requires
more assumptions because comparisons of marginal utilities between different generations are
involved. In particular, we partly need to parameterize household preferences as discussed in
section 2.6.
2.5 Consumption equivalent impact on each generation
Suppose there is a hypothetical increase in co by φ percent. Utility of the generation born
in t would then be given by u(cyt , n̄ − nt, (1 + φt)cot+1). A first order Taylor approximation
around φt = 0 yields
u(cyt , n̄− nt, (1 + φt)cot+1) ≈ u(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1) + uco(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1)cot+1φt
The change in utility can therefore be approximated by
u(cyt , n̄− nt, (1 + φt)cot+1)− u(c
y
t , n̄− nt, cot+1) ≈ λot+1cot+1φt.
The change in a generation’s utility due to the change in τ0 is linear in this generations
marginal utility (cf. equation (23)). In particular, the change in utility takes the form
λot+1Ωt, which is then weighted by ξt and summed up in order to get the overall welfare
change. For each generation, we can approximatively calculate the (hypothetical) percentage
change in consumption when retired which would make this generation equally good off as
12
the policy change:
λot+1c
o
t+1φt ≈ λot+1Ωt (24)
⇒ φt ≈
Ωt
cot+1
(25)
This yields the approximative welfare effect of the policy change in terms of consumption for
each generation.
Proposition 1. Consider an OLG economy as described in section 2.1 with a PAYGO social
security system. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then, the impact of a one-time
marginal change in τ0 on the welfare of the generation born in t is equivalent (up to a first-
order approximation) to an increase in this generations consumption when retired by φt, where
φt =
Ωt
cot+1
and
Ω−1 = w0n0(1 + χ−1,0)−
dw0
dτ0
n0(1− τ0)(1 + χ−1,0) +
dn0
dτ0
w0τ0(1 + χ−1,0), (26)
Ω0 = −R1w0n0 +R1
dw0
dτ0
n0(1− τ0)−
dw1
dτ0
n1(1− τ1)(1 + χ0,1)
+
dn1
dτ0
w1τ1(1 + χ0,1), (27)
Ωt = Rt+1
dwt
dτ0
nt(1− τt)−
dwt+1
dτ0
nt+1(1− τt+1)(1 + χt,t+1)
+
dnt+1
dτ0
wt+1τt+1(1 + χt,t+1), (28)
for t > 0.
Observe that equation (26), (27), and (28) contains impulse response functions with respect
to a transitory shock in the payroll tax rate, {dwtdτ0 ,
dnt
dτ0
}j=0,...,∞, predictions of economic
quantities, and projected working age population growth. This allows for an implementation
of equation (30) based on a reduced form VAR model. We provide a more detailed discussion
of the implementation in section 3.
2.6 Overall welfare effect
Proposition 1 allows for an approximate welfare analysis by generation in terms of con-
sumption equivalences. However, for a throughout policy evaluation this information is not
sufficient because the Ramsey planner cares about a weighted sum of all future generations’
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utilities. Thus, knowledge of the overall effect of a change in the payroll tax is imperative.
Because utility is not quasi-linear, we need to convert dWdτ0 into a money metric (Chetty,
2009). We obtain an intuitive metric by normalizing the welfare change given an increase in
the payroll tax rate by the welfare gain from a hypothetical additional unit of income, a0, of
the initial old household (dWda0 = ξ−1λ
o
0):
dW
dτ0
dW
da0
=w0n0
(
−λ
o
1
λo0
R1
ξ0
ξ−1
+ (1 + χ−1,0)
)
+
∞∑
t=0
dwt
dτ0
nt(1− τt)
(
λot+1
λo0
Rt+1
ξt
ξ−1
− (1 + χt−1,t)
λot
λo0
ξt−1
ξ−1
)
(29)
+
∞∑
t=0
dnt
dτ0
wtτt(1 + χt−1,t)
λot
λo0
ξt−1
ξ−1
Equation (29) shows that an assessment of the overall effect dW/dτ0 requires aggregating
the generation-specific effects. This aggregation inherently includes a comparison of weighted
marginal utilities between different generations and, therefore, requires some additional struc-
ture on marginal utilities, λot+1, and welfare weights, ξt. We impose the following assumption
on the household utility function.
Assumption 3. Household preferences are additively separable over time and flow utility of
the old households is of CRRA type, i.e.
u(cyt , n̄− nt, cot+1) = u(c
y
t , n̄− nt) + β
(
cot+1
)1−γ − 1
1− γ
where β is the individual discount factor and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Notice that Assumption 3 implies that the ratio of marginal utilities is a function of gross
consumption growth which can be predicted empirically.
uc(c
o
j)
uc(co0)
=
(
coj
co0
)−γ
As a final step towards the implementation of equation (29), we need to impose some structure
on the welfare weights (ξj). Following the literature (e.g. Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008)
we make the following assumption.
Assumption 4. The social planner’s welfare weights for different generations reflect both
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the discount factor of individual households and the size of the generations:
ξj = β(1 + χj)ξj−1,
with ξ−1 = 1
We are now in the position to summarize the empirically implementable formula for the
welfare consequences of a change in the payroll tax in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider an OLG economy as described in ection 2.1 with a PAYGO social
security system. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 hold. Then, the overall welfare gain
from an increase in the payroll tax τ relative to a $1.00 increase the income of the initial old
household is given by
dW
dτ0
dW
da0
=w0n0
(
(1 + χ−1,0)
(
1−
(
co1
co0
)−γ
R1β
))
+
∞∑
t=0
dwt
dτ0
nt(1− τt)
(
(1 + χ−1,t)β
t
((
cot+1
co0
)−γ
Rt+1β −
(
cot
co0
)−γ))
(30)
+
∞∑
t=0
dnt
dτ0
wtτt
(
cot
co0
)−γ
βt(1 + χ−1,t)
Apart from γ and β, the quantities in equation (30) are either observable or can be esti-
mated. As for the approximate consumption equivalent formulae in Proposition 1, equation
(30) contains impulse response functions, predictions of economic quantities, and projected
population growth. In addition, consumption growth must be projected to infer the ratios of
marginal utilities. Given this similarities, implementation can be based on the same reduced
form VAR estimates. We refer to section 3 for more details.
3 Empirical analysis
We illustrate our method for computing the welfare consequences of a change in the pay-
roll tax by analyzing the social security system in the United States.6 First, the empirical
implementation of Propositions 1 and 2 is discussed. Second, we describe the data and the
aggregation to the frequency of the OLG model. Finally, we present the results and some
robustness checks.
6See e.g. Feldstein (2005) for a description of the social security system in the United States.
15
3.1 Methodology
Proposition 1 provides formulae for the percentage change in consumption when retired which
would make a generation equally good off as the change in the payroll tax rate. Proposition 2
provides a formula for the overall welfare effect of a change in the payroll tax rate. The
quantities needed to estimate the equations in these propositions empirically can be divided
into four groups.
Payroll tax. In the United States, payroll taxes for social security can be split into the
designated purposes of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI)
and Hospital Insurance (HI). Given the setup of our model, only payroll taxes used to fund
the PAYGO system are considered. Thus, we take τ to be the payroll tax for OASI. We
evaluate equations (26) to (28) and (30) at the current level of τ = 0.106.
Impulse responses of labor supply and factor prices. The welfare effect depends on the
dynamic responses of labor and wages with respect to a change in the payroll tax rate. A
natural way to estimate these dynamic responses with respect to an exogenous change in
the payroll tax rate is to estimate impulse response functions based on a reduced form VAR
model:
Yt = c+ Φ1Yt−1 + . . .+ ΦpYt−p + θτt + εt. (31)
The impulse response to a change in τt is given by
dYt+j
dτt
=

θ for j = 0
Φ1
dYt−1+j
dτt
+ . . .+ Φp
dYt−p+j
dτt
for j = 1, 2, . . .
(32)
where dYkdτt = 0 for k < t. Yt is a vector of endogenous variables, Φj , c and θ are matrices
and vectors of coefficients. εt is a vector of error terms which is multivariate white noise.
We estimate a four-dimensional VAR model of order 3 using quarterly data on growth rates
of hours worked per capita, real wages, real consumption per capita and real GDP per
capita. All of these growth rates are stationary. The VAR order of 3 is chosen based on
residual autocorrelation tests and the Akaike information criterion. We include the payroll
tax rate as an exogenous variable. While the payroll tax rate clearly depends on factors such
as life expectancy, retirement age and the shape of the age pyramid, we consider it to be
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exogenous in the present setting. These factors influencing τt are unlikely to have a direct
impact on Yt conditional on the lagged values of Y . Moreover, because we have quarterly
data and τt is determined by legislation, which takes some time to adjust, τt is likely to be
independent of εt conditional on lagged values of Y . Therefore, our identifying assumption
is that E[εtτt|Yt−1, . . . , Yt−p] = 0. To provide some evidence for our identifying assumption,
we perform a Granger causality by including τt as an endogenous variable in the VAR model.
We find that τt is exogenous in the sense that it cannot be predicted using lagged values of
Y .
Forecasts. The empirical implementation of equations (26) to (28) and (30) requires
forecasts for present and future generations on real wages, real interest rates, labor, working
age population growth, and consumption of retirees. Because long-term forecasting is a very
delicate issue, we decide to conduct a scenario analysis to account for the uncertainty of future
developments (see section 3.3.4). The baseline scenario is constructed as follows. Real wages,
hours worked and real consumption of retirees are projected using the (geometric) mean
growth rate of the observed data. The projected real interest rate is set to the mean of the
observed data. For the working age population, we base the projections on the (geometric)
mean growth rate according to the national population projections released by the U.S.
Census Bureau.7
Parameters. We avoid identification and estimation of the parameters β and γ. Instead,
we estimate equation (30) for various plausible parameter values.
3.2 Data
Table 1 provides a description of the data that are used for the empirical estimation described
in the previous section. However, these data cannot directly be plugged into equations (26)
to (28) and (30) in order to evaluate the PAYGO system. Particular attention has to be
paid to the aggregation of the data in order to fit the framework of the OLG model. In the
OLG model, two time periods correspond to an entire lifespan. Following the literature (e.g.
Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008; Song, 2011), we take one period in the model to be 30
years. Period 0 in equations (26) to (28) and (30) corresponds to the years 2013 to 2042,
period 1 to the years 2043 to 2072, etc. Table 2 explains how the quantities needed for
estimating the sufficient statistic are aggregated.
7http://www.census.gov/population/projections/, last accessed on November 15, 2013.
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Variable Description Sample period
nt Number of hours worked per capita per quarter. The series is con-
structed using an index of hours worked in the business sector (source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics), scaled up to match total hours worked in
the base year and divided by the number of people between 15 and 65
years old (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics).
1948q1 to 2013q1
wt Real hourly wage (in 2010 dollars). In correspondance with nt, we use
an index of real hourly compensation in the business sector (source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics), scaled to match average hourly earnings of
all employees in the total private sector in 2010.
1947q1 to 2013q1
Rt Real interest rate. The series is constructed using the 10-Year Treasury
Constant Maturity Rate (source: Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System) as nominal long-term interest rate. Our inflation measure
is based on the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics).
1962q1 to 2012q2
χt Working age population growth rate (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics,
and Census Bureau).
1952q2 to 2013q1
cot Real consumption of retirees (in 2010 dollars). The series is constructed
by deflating yearly data on total average expenditures of people over age
65 (source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey).
1988 to 2011
real consumption
per capita growth
Growth rate of real Private Final Consumption Expenditure in United
States (source: OECD National Accounts Statistics) divided by total
population (source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau).
1952q1 to 2013q1
real GDP per
capita growth
Growth rate of real GDP (source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis). 1947q1 to 2013q1
Table 1: Description of the Data
Variable Aggregation
nt Quarterly data are added up over 30 years in order to get the number
of hours worked per capita over 30 years.
wt The average real hourly wage over 30 years is computed.
Rt The real long-term gross interest rate per annum is projected to 30 years
(i.e. R30y = R
30
p.a.).
χt,z For each 30 year window, the average size of the working age population
is computed. This series is then used to compute the growth rate of the
working age population.
cot Annual data are added up over 30 years in order to get total real con-
sumption per capita over 30 years.
Table 2: Aggregation of higher frequency data to OLG frequency of 30 years.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 VAR
Figure 1 plots cumulative impulse response functions with respect to a increase in the payroll
tax rate by one percentage point for 120 quarters, which corresponds to an increase in the
payroll tax rate for one generation in the OLG model. Both hours worked and real wages are
negatively affected in the long-run. When the payroll tax rate returns to its initial level after
120 quarters, the impulse responses of the growth rates go back to zero whereas the levels of
hours work and real wages remain below their initial values.
The impulse responses match economic intuition. An increase in taxes reduces the income
of households when young. As a consequence, these households reduce consumption in both
periods of their life which implies that, for given transfers and factor prices, savings are
reduced. Thus, we intuitively expect that this policy change leads to a decline in capital.
This should depress wages and increase interest rates, which correspond to their marginal
product, respectively. Given higher payroll taxes and this downward pressure on wages, it is
not surprising that hours worked decline.
In order to implement equations (26) to (28) and (30), we need the impulse responses
dwj
dτ0
and
dnj
dτ0
. These responses of wages and hours are computed by subtracting the projected
path for these variables absent any shock from the projected path given the increase in the
payroll tax rate (which is constructed using the cumulative impulse response functions in
figure 1). The resulting level responses are shown in figure 2. Hours worked decline by a
small amount. The maximum response amounts to minus 700 hours for a generation, which
means a reduction of labor by 2 hours per month. While the response of labor becomes
smaller in absolute values over time, the response of wages explodes. This is due to the fact
that when the shock has died out and wage growth returns to its long-run rate, the level of
wages is lower than it would be absent the change in taxes. As time goes by, this difference
in the wage level increases exponentially with the long-run growth rate of real wages.
3.3.2 Consumption equivalent impact
The impulse response functions estimated above and predicted economic quantities allow for
calculating the impact of the payroll tax change on each generation. Proposition 1 shows
how the change in utility of each generation can be approximately expressed in terms of a
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Figure 1: Cumulative impulse response of the growth rates of hours worked and real wages
to an increase in the payroll tax rate for 120 quarters (i.e. one generation)
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Figure 2: Impulse response of hours worked and real wages to an increase in the payroll tax
rate for one generation
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percentage change in consumption during retirement. The results are summarized in table 3.
Several results deserve closer attention. First, the payroll tax change has a negative
impact on labor and therefore decreases transfers, but this labor effect seems to be of minor
relevance. Second, the factor price effects are large compared to both the direct and the
labor effects. The factor price effect can be further decomposed into the effect due to changes
of wages when young, wages when old and interest rates. This decomposition reveals that
changes in the interest rate and in the wage level when young have a large impact whereas
changes in the wage level when old, which affect the level of transfers paid to retirees and
therefore also utility, are less important.
generation 0 generation 1 generation 2 generation 3 generation 4
direct effect 0.95 -1.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
factor price effect 3.38 1.75 -2.44 -2.64 -2.87
labor effect -0.07 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 -0.26
total effect 4.26 0.27 -2.66 -2.89 -3.13
Table 3: Percentage retiree’s consumption change with equivalent welfare effect as the policy
change.
The results in table 3 indicate a distributional conflict across generations. We find that the
initial old generation benefits, not only directly through higher transfers but also indirectly
due to favorable factor price changes. In particular, they benefit from higher interest rates
on their savings. This indirect effect even exceeds the direct impact. For the initial young
generation, there are counteracting effects. While there is obviously a negative direct effect
of having to pay higher taxes, there is a positive indirect effect owing to changes in factor
prices, which leaves the overall effect close to zero. The decomposition of the factor price
effect reveals that the benefit from higher interest rates outweighs the loss due to lower wages.
Finally, the future generations which are not directly affected by the policy change are worse
off. The negative effect is mostly due to the lower wage level during their working age.
The findings in table 3 have important implications for the welfare evaluation of PAYGO
systems. It is not sufficient to consider only the direct redistribution effects of a policy
change in the PAYGO system because there are indirect effects of the tax change on wages
and interest rates which seem to have substantial welfare impacts. Moreover, not only the
directly affected generations must be taken into account but also future generations which
are indirectly affected.
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3.3.3 Overall welfare effect
The previous section allowed for an analysis of the approximate welfare impact for each
generation. Since some generations are better and others are worse off, it is important to
have a measure which aggregates the utility changes of all generations in order to evaluate
the policy change. Proposition 2 provides such a measure. In this section, we use equation
(30) to evaluate the PAYGO social security system of the United States.
The unobservable parameters γ and β are set to a variety of values covering the range of
parameter values commonly used in the literature.8 Table 4 shows the result for a selection
of parameter values. The sign of the welfare change due to an increase in the payroll tax
crucially depends on these parameters. The larger β, the more relative weight is given to
future generations. As table 3 shows, the current generations benefit from the policy change
whereas the future generations are negatively affected. Thus, the overall welfare effect is
positive for low values of β and negative for large values of β. Although γ is conceptually
very different from β, it also matters for the relative welfare weights across generations. Since
we project consumption to grow, future generations have lower marginal utility. How much
marginal utility shrinks over time depends on γ. A decrease in γ shifts relative weight to
future generations, similar as an increase in β.
β = 0.930 β = 0.92530 β = 0.9530 β = 0.97530 β = 0.99530
γ = 0.0 5.5 5.5 5.1 -0.1 -1’012.3
γ = 0.5 5.5 5.5 5.2 2.1 -258.5
γ = 1.0 5.5 5.5 5.3 3.3 -73.4
γ = 1.5 5.5 5.5 5.4 4.0 -23.1
γ = 2.0 5.5 5.5 5.4 4.4 -7.3
Table 4: Overall welfare effect (in 10’000) according to (30) as a function of the parameters
γ and β.
To understand the driving factors of the numbers in table 4, it is instructive to decompose
the values by channels and generations. In section 2, we have shown that the welfare conse-
quences of a change in the payroll tax is the sum of three different components: the direct
change in taxes and transfers, the welfare impact via changes in the wage and interest rate,
and the welfare impact via changes in labor. As a benchmark case, table 5 shows the results
8In particular, we analyze the welfare change for values γ ∈ [0, 2] and β ∈ [0.930, 0.99530]. The later
interval stems from assuming an individual yearly discount factor of at least 0.9 and strictly less than 1.
22
of this decomposition for β = 0.9530 and γ = 1. Of course, the sign of the numbers in table 5
are identical with the sign of the numbers in table 3. However, in contrast to table 3, future
generations are now downweighted because β < 1 and because of the projection
cot
co0
> 1 for
t > 0, which implies lower marginal utility for future generations.
The sum of the labor effects across generations is negative for each considered combination
of parameters γ and β. The sum of the factor price effects is positive except for β = 0.99530.
The same holds for the sum of the direct welfare effects. Thus, the sign of the overall welfare
effect depends crucially on the direct and on the factor price effect, which may be positive or
negative depending on the parameter values.
generation 0 generation 1 generation 2 generation 3 generation 4 total
direct effect 12.2 -4.4 0 0 0 7.9
factor price effect 43.7 6.0 -2.0 -0.5 -0.1 47.0
labor effect -0.9 -0.7 -0.2 -0.0 -0.0 -1.9
total 55.1 0.9 -2.2 -0.6 -0.2 53.1
Table 5: Decomposition of the overall welfare effect (in 1’000) by generations and channels,
based on parameter values γ = 1 and β = 0.9530.
It is important to recall that our results are only locally valid. Equation (30) captures the
marginal effect of a change in the payroll tax as a function macroeconomic variables and, in
particular, of τ . Thus, the results presented in this section provide a welfare evaluation of the
current PAYGO system in the United States (with τ = 0.106). This is especially important
when comparing our result to the findings in the literature based on structural models,
which typically do not analyze marginal changes. For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) analyze the welfare effects of the introduction of an unfunded social security system
with 60 percent benefit-to-earnings replacement rate under different tax regimes. Similar to
our results, they find gains for the older generations and losses for the younger and future
generations. Using an applied general equilibrium model, Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) find the
optimal replacement rate of an unfunded social security system to be 30% (as opposed the
empirically more realistic rate of 60%). Moreover, their results indicate that even with an
empirically realistic replacement rate of 60% a social security system can be welfare enhancing.
Kotlikoff et al. (2007) consider different alternative policies to mitigate the problems of the
demographic transition in the United States. One such policy consists of a 50% benefit
reduction which helps to limit the (endogenous) growth in the payroll tax. Their simulations
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show welfare losses for the older and the present generations and welfare gains for the future
generations. Because in our model a benefit reduction is directly linked to a tax cut through
the government budget constraint, these results are qualitatively comparable to our welfare
projections. At this point it is important to note that instead of focussing on the payroll tax
rate as the policy instrument, our analysis could alternatively be based on the benefit rates.
3.3.4 Robustness checks
Detailed knowledge of the future development of real wages, hours worked, real interest rates,
consumption of retirees, and working age population growth is crucial for the evaluation of
PAYGO systems based on equations (26) to (28) and (30). As a baseline scenario, we use
means or mean growth rates of the available data sample for forecasting.9 In the light of
structural breaks, this might be an inappropriate forecast to use given that we need projec-
tions for several future generations. Therefore, this section conducts a sensitivity analysis on
how our findings depend on the projected paths for the relevant variables. Using scenarios to
account for the uncertainty of future developments is quite common in the literature on social
security systems (e.g. Pecchenino and Utendorf, 1999; Kotlikoff et al., 2007; Imrohoroglu and
Kitao, 2009; McGrattan and Prescott, 2013).
In addition to the baseline scenario, we consider a higher and a lower future development
of each variable of interest. Figrue 3 depicts the alternative paths. We cover a wide range
of possible developments. For time series with a positive (negative) trend in levels,10 the
high (low) scenario is constructed assuming a 50% higher growth rate compared to the base-
line. The low (high) scenario consists in eliminating the trend and assuming the series to be
constant. For working age population growth, which the U.S. Census Bureau predicts to be
lower in the future than it was in the past, the high scenario consists in fixing growth at the
positive rate projected for the next generation. The low scenario is created by reducing the
(yearly) growth rate from the baseline case by additional 0.1 percentage points per genera-
tion.11 Finally, since the real interest rate has no trend, the high (low) scenario is constructed
by adding (subtracting) 0.1 percentage points to the (yearly) baseline real interest rate per
9An exception is the working age population growth rate, for which the forecast is based on the national
population projections from the U.S. Census Bureau.
10Real wages and real consumption per capita of retirees show a positive trend, hours worked per capita
show a negative trend.
11Note that figrue 3 depicts working age population growth over generations of 30 years. For example, the
long-run baseline forecast of 12.8% would translate into an average yearly growth rate of 0.4%.
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generation.12
For each scenario, we compute the consumption equivalent impact (equations (26) to
(28)) and the overall welfare effect (equation (30)) for various parameter values β and γ (i.e.
we recompute the tables 3 and 4).
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Figure 3: Different scenarios for the future development of variables affecting the welfare
change. The solid line represents the baseline, the dashed lines indicate the high and low
scenario.
real wages hours worked consumption population growth real interest rate
high 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.3
baseline 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
low 4.6 5.2 5.1 5.2 5.3
Table 6: Values (in 10’000s) for the overall welfare effect according to (30) for different
scenarios.
Overall, our results are very robust regarding changes in the future development of
macroeconomic variables. For all scenarios, the sign of the consumption equivalent impact
is identical to table 3 for almost each channel and generation. Moreover, although there are
some quantitative differences, the overall welfare effect is stable over many of the scenar-
ios. Table 6 summarizes the overall welfare effect for the different scenarios for the case of
β = 0.9530 and γ = 1. For this combination of parameter values, all scenarios yield virtually
the same overall welfare effect.
12Note that figrue 3 depicts the net real interest rate over generations of 30 years. For example, the long-run
baseline forecast of net 108.2% interest would translate into an average yearly net interest rate of 2.5%.
25
For other combinations of parameter values, especially for large values of β, the overall
welfare effect is less stable. In particular, the evolution of consumption of retirees may be
crucial. Consumption of retirees matters for marginal utility and hence for the relative welfare
weight of different generations. The more consumption grows, the lower is the weight of future
generations. Since future generations are negatively affected by the change in the payroll tax
rate whereas the initial old generation is positively affected, higher consumption growth is
associated with a more positive overall welfare effect.
4 Conclusion
Old-age provision constitutes an essential element of many developed countries’ social in-
surance programs. As demographic changes cause increasing financial stress for PAYGO
systems, reforms of existing systems become more and more relevant.
This paper proposes a new approach for the welfare analysis of PAYGO social security
systems. Based on a standard OLG model with endogenous labor supply, we derive a formula
for the local welfare consequences of a change in the payroll tax that can be viewed as a
sufficient statistic (cf. Chetty, 2009). We propose two approaches to implement this formula
based on predictions for different key quantities of the model and the reduced form estimates
of a VAR. Using data for the United States, we find substantial positive welfare effects
for today’s retirees, small welfare gains for today’s workers and welfare losses for future
generations. To this end, our findings indicate that changing the payroll tax induces a
distributional conflict across generations. The overall welfare effect of increasing the payroll
tax is estimated to be positive provided that the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the
household discount factor lie within a plausible range. A detailed decomposition by channels
and generations sheds light on the driving forces behind this result. In particular, we find
that the effect through factor prices outweighs the direct effect (through higher taxes and
higher benefits) and the labor effect. Robustness checks confirm that our findings do not
crucially depend on the precise predictions of key quantities.
Compared to the traditional approach to welfare analysis based on calibrated and esti-
mated structural models, our method does not require the knowledge of the deep structure of
the model. In particular, we do not require a full parameterization of household preferences
and a specification of the aggregate production function. Instead, the welfare consequences
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of a change in the payroll tax can be deduced from reduced form estimates under weaker and
arguably more credible assumptions.
Our approach shares two important limitations of the sufficient statistic approach (cf.
Chetty, 2008, 2009): First, our results are only locally valid. In particular, the analysis of
real world payroll tax changes would require additional assumptions due to the discrete (and
not infinitesimal) nature of these policy changes. Second, a new sufficient statistic needs to
be derived for every research question. Importantly for our application, it is not possible
to use the same sufficient statistic for the analysis of mixed social security systems or to
compare different pension systems (e.g. funded and unfunded systems). In the light of these
limitations, we consider our method to be complementary to the structural approach, because
it allows for a weakening of required assumptions on the one hand, but it only applies to the
specific question of welfare consequences of payroll tax changes in PAYGO systems on the
other hand.
Regarding the sufficient statistics literature, our analysis extends the range of applications
to macroeconomic dynamic general equilibrium models and highlights the challenges asso-
ciated with deriving and implementing sufficient statistics in these models. The basic idea
of deriving sufficient statistics in dynamic general equilibrium models and estimating them
using time series analysis can be applied in different settings and is an interesting direction
for further research.
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